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Abstract: 
In this paper we propose a set of rules for developing modular architectures. We first 
consider the well-known concept of "Design Rules" advanced by Baldwin and Clark 
(2000). We then propose a broader conceptualization called "Modularity Design Rules" 
that is derived from later studies of the strategic, managerial, and organizational 
processes that must also be undertaken to implement successful modular development 
projects. We elaborate the critical role that the proposed Modularity Design Rules play in 
strategically grounding, organizing, and managing modular architecture development 
processes. We also identify key roles that top management must fulfill in supporting 
implementation of the proposed rules. We then provide evidence in support of the 
proposed Modularity Design Rules through a case study of the Renault-Nissan Alliance's 
successful development and use of a modular "Common Module Family" architecture 
between 2009 and 2014.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Beginning in the 1990s, a new stream of management research began to 
investigate how the architectures a firm adopts for its product designs may affect its 
product strategies, management processes and organization designs (Henderson and 
Clark 1990; Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995; Sanchez 1995, 1999; Sanchez and Mahoney 
1996; Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; Shibata, Yano and Kodama, 2005; Shibata, 2009).  
More recently, a parallel stream of macro-level economic research has also suggested that 
the product architectures adopted by firms may significantly affect both the vertical 
structure of an industry and the nature of the competitive and cooperative dynamics 
among firms in an industry (Chesbrough and Kusunoki 2001; Sanchez 2008; Colfer and 
Baldwin 2010; Sanchez and Mahoney 2013; Sanchez and Hang 2017).  
 Research in this stream has established rather conclusively that use of modular 
product architectures can substantially shorten development times, increase speed to 
market, reduce development and production costs, increase product variety, and enable 
cooperative interactions among the participants in an industry, leading to heightened 
rates of market development and technological change for firms with modular 
architecture development capabilities (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Worren, Moore 
and Cardona 2002; Sanchez 1999; Sanchez and Hang 2017). Research has also shown 
that achieving the advantages obtainable from modular architectures, however, requires 
that managers understand and be willing to adopt new kinds of market strategies, 
management processes, development processes, and organizational structures that differ 
quite fundamentally from practices followed in traditional new product development 
(Sanchez 2000, 2008; Sanchez and Collins 2001; Colfer and Baldwin 2010) and from 
derivative practices such as "overlapping problem solving" (Clark and Fujimoto 1991).  
 Most notably, modular architecture development processes require much higher 
levels of architectural definition and organizational discipline (in developing a defined 
architecture) than are typically maintained in conventional NPD processes. Research 
suggests that the greatest challenge to both strategic and technical managers of firms 
converting from traditional product development processes to modular development 
processes is likely to come from the need to adequately define the strategic mission, 
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component structure, and interfaces between components of a new architecture as the 
first step in a modular architecture development process, rather than letting a new 
architecture evolve and emerge during component development, as is typically the case 
in traditional product development processes (Sanchez 2000, 2013, 2015).  
 Adequately defining a new architecture before beginning component development 
processes requires both (i) defining how the new architecture can most advantageously 
be decomposed into functional components ("strategic partitioning" of the architecture), 
and (ii) defining the interfaces between components to enable a strategically intended 
range of configurability of components within the product architecture (Sanchez and 
Mahoney 1996; Sanchez 2000). As we elaborate further below, defining a new 
architecture to this extent as a first step in a development process requires specific kinds 
of interactions between senior managers who will use the new architecture to carry out 
product market strategies, on the one hand, and technical managers who need to develop 
components and interfaces capable of providing the functionalities and strategic 
flexibilities desired from the new architecture, on the other (Sanchez 1995, 2000; 
Sanchez and Collins 2001). The central proposition of this paper is that these essential 
upstream managerial interactions and subsequent development activities need to be 
carried out within a clear framework of specific rules for governing and guiding a firm's 
processes for developing modular architectures. 
 In their well-known ex post study of the technical structure of the IBM System 360 
computer architecture, Baldwin and Clark (2000) used the term Design Rules to refer to 
technical design practices that should be followed to create a product architecture with 
technically decoupled components that enable configuration of component variations 
within the architecture. At the same time and subsequently, using "real-time" research 
methods to investigate ongoing modular development processes, Sanchez (2000, 2013, 
2015) argued that modular architectures cannot be developed successfully through 
traditional development processes and practices, and that new rules and new roles are 
required to govern and guide a firm's strategic, organizational, and managerial processes 
for developing modular architectures. 
 In this paper we undertake to extend prior research into rules applicable to 
modular architecture development processes by elaborating a formalized set of 
Modularity Design Rules   (v.7 April 2018) 4 
"Modularity Design Rules" ("MDR") that identify specific strategic, managerial, and 
organizational practices that we suggest are essential to achieving success in modular 
architecture development processes. In so doing, we also identify what we believe are the 
most significant challenges to be met by managers in converting their organizations from 
traditional development practices to modular strategies and development processes 
consistent with the proposed MDRs (Sanchez 2000, 2013, 2015). 
 We also undertake to lend support to the validity and importance of the proposed 
MDRs by reporting some of the key findings of a multi-year, longitudinal study of the 
Renault-Nissan Alliance's (RNA) successful initiative to create a "Common Module 
Family" (CMF) modular architecture that would be the basis for achieving significant cost 
reductions in their vehicles while maintaining distinctive brand identities and requisite 
product variety.1 We suggest that RNA's success in creating the CMF modular 
architecture that was eventually used for more than 50 product models was made 
possible by RNA management's recognition of the importance of the MDR that we 
propose here and by their successful implementation in RNA’s CMF development process.  
 Our discussion is structured in the following way: 
 In Section 1 we compare the essentially technical concept of Design Rules 
suggested by Baldwin and Clark (2000) with the managerial and organizational 
perspectives on rules for modular architecture development processes proposed by 
Sanchez (2000). 
 In Section 2 we elaborate our proposed set of Modularity Design Rules and explain 
both the theoretical basis and practical considerations motivating each rule. 
                                                        
1 The case study whose key findings are reported here was launched through extensive interviews 
conducted with key Nissan and Renault-Nissan Alliance (RNA) executives and managers 
between November 2012 and August 2013. We would like to thank in particular Mr. Hideyuki 
Sakamoto, at the time Corporate Vice President of Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., and Mr. Hiroyoshi 
Yamamoto, at the time General Manager in charge of the RNA executive office, for their 
generous cooperation through extended interviews and in supporting the gathering of detailed 
information on the processes initiated by RNA for the development of the CFM modular 
architecture. Additional data and perspectives were obtained through subsequent e-mail  
exchanges with Mr. Yamamoto, as well as from publicly available sources. We also thank Mr. 
Yamamoto for reviewing draft versions of the case. 
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 In Section 3 we suggest some essential roles for senior managers in implementing 
the proposed MDR.  
 In Section 4 we present some key aspects of our case study of Renault-Nissan 
Alliance's development of the first "Common Module Family" architecture intended 
to serve as the basis for a range of Renault and Nissan vehicle models.  
Section 5 summarizes what we suggest are the key findings from our case 
study, highlighting the various aspects of RNA's successful modular development 
initiative incorporating the MDRs that we propose here. 
 Section 6 offers concluding comments. 
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1. "DESIGN RULES" RECONSIDERED 
 
 In addition to noting the potential strategic benefits of using modular 
architectures in product market competition, some management researchers in the mid-
1990s also observed that many firms using modular product designs appeared to have 
adopted new kinds of organizational forms and processes to support their development 
of modular product architectures (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995; Sanchez 1995; 
Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). By the late 1990s, some researchers began to investigate in 
greater depth the processes that firms might use to create modular architectures. In 2000, 
two key studies appeared with some answers to that question. 
 In 2000 Baldwin and Clark published their well-known book Design Rules, based 
largely on their study of the technical structure of the 1960s IBM System 360 computer's 
modular architecture. Adapting the Design Quality Matrix (Clausen 1989) used in Total 
Quality Management as a graphic tool for relating specific parts of product designs to 
consumer preferences, Baldwin and Clark developed a "Design Structure Matrix" ("DSM") 
to identify the intended functional interactions of components within a product design. 
They then applied their DSM tool to the analysis of the IBM System 360's modular 
computer architecture. Their DSM analysis of the IBM System 360 showed that certain 
components were technically isolated or "decoupled" from other key components -- 
thereby enabling both technically independent, "decoupled" processes for developing the 
components and subsequent reconfiguration of component variations within the 
architecture to meet differing customer requirements for computing. 
 Baldwin and Clark proposed that the DSM for a modular product architecture not 
only revealed the ex post technical decoupling of components within an architecture, but 
also implied a set of ex ante "Design Rules" for creating technical decoupling among 
components during the architecture development process. In effect, Baldwin and Clark 
argued that an organization seeking to create a modular design should create and then 
follow a set of Design Rules that explicitly seek to technically decouple specific 
components in order to make the new design configurable (i.e., modular).   
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 Contemporaneous with and subsequent to Baldwin and Clark's (2000) 
development of their essentially technical notion of Design Rules, other researchers 
began to examine in greater depth various organizational and managerial processes 
involved in creating modular architectures. Concurrent with the publication of Baldwin 
and Clark's historical study, and based on several "real-time" studies of ongoing modular 
development processes in Philips, General Electric, Chrysler, and other firms, Sanchez 
(2000) proposed that design rules for guiding the technical design of modular 
architectures, such as those noted by Baldwin and Clark (2000), can only be implemented 
effectively if a firm is also following other rules governing the strategic, organizational, 
and managerial processes that must be undertaken to initiate and guide modular 
development processes. In effect, Sanchez (2000) argued that technical design rules 
revealed through DSM analyses are only the most readily visible tip of an iceberg, and 
that a broader and deeper set of "new rules and new roles" for organizing and managing 
modular development processes underlie and enable the use of technical design rules in a 
modular development process.    
 In the next section, we draw on and extend this broader perspective to elaborate a 
set of Modularity Design Rules (MDR) for governing the organizational and managerial 
processes essential in developing modular architectures. 
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2. MODULARITY DESIGN RULES  
 
  We begin our elaboration of rules for managing modular architecture 
development processes by making a critical distinction between "technical 
modularity" and "strategic modularity" in product designs. We then divide our 
elaboration of Modularity Design Rules ("MDRs") into (i) rules that apply to 
strategic, organizational, and managerial processes to be undertaken before 
beginning technical development of the components to be used in an architecture 
(Section 2.2), (ii) rules that apply most critically during the technical development of 
components (Section 2.3), and (iii) rules that apply after the technical development 
of components and during the commercial use of the architecture (Section 2.4). 
 The MDR that we elaborate here are drawn from more than 25 years of "real-
time action research”2 into numerous firms' processes for creating modular product 
architectures in the automotive, aircraft, consumer electronics, information 
technology, manufacturing equipment, office equipment, home appliance, personal 
health care, medical equipment, confections, financial services, health services, and 
travel industries, as well as from multi-year longitudinal studies3 of modular 
development processes in a number of Japanese firms. 
 
2.1  "Technical Modularity" versus "Strategic Modularity" 
 Sanchez (2013) observes that although many products today exhibit some 
degree of modularity in their designs, there are important differences in what 
modularity is intended to accomplish in different product designs, as well as in the 
development processes through which different firms have sought to introduce 
modularity into their product designs. On this basis, Sanchez (2013, p.209) 
distinguishes two different kinds of modularity in product architectures: 
                                                        
2 This “real-time action research” is reported in Sanchez 1995, 2000, 2013, and 2015 in the 
list of references. 
3 The longitudinal studies are reported in part in Shibata et al. 2005 and Shibata 2009 in the 
references. 
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 Technical modularity exists when at least some interfaces between 
components in a product design have been specified to allow the substitution of two 
or more component variations into the design without requiring compensating 
design changes in components "on the other side" of the interfaces. Technical 
modularity is often created through routine engineering processes that seek to 
reduce the development cost of a design by re-using industry standard or pre-
existing component designs and/or interface specifications. For example, 
engineering designers often adopt industry standard bolt patterns as interfaces for 
attaching various kinds of wheel and pulley hubs, or industry standard electronic 
interfaces (like USB interfaces) for connecting digital devices.  
 By contrast, strategic modularity is created through a strategically motivated 
architecture development process in which the decomposition of the architecture 
into functional components and the specification of the interfaces between 
components are both designed to create specific forms of strategic flexibility in the 
product architecture (Sanchez 1995). For example, the component structure and 
interfaces in an architecture may be designed with a primary objective of allowing a 
wide range of component variations to be used in configuring a strategically desired 
range of product variations.   
 The Modularity Design Rules (MDRs) that we elaborate here apply to 
processes for creating strategic modularity in a product architecture -- that is, to 
firm processes whose intention is to create a modular product architecture with 
specific forms of strategic flexibility intended to directly support a firm's product 
strategies. Moreover, the MDRs elaborated below are explicitly normative in nature. 
They are not intended to describe what firms may do in trying to use modularity in 
their product architectures. Rather, the MDR are rules that identify critical strategic, 
organizational, and managerial issues that we suggest have to be recognized and 
addressed in developing strategically modular architectures, and to propose specific 
ways in which those issues can be managed successfully.  
 The MDRs proposed here are derived both from modularity theory and from 
the authors' extensive observations and analyses of successful and unsuccessful 
attempts to develop modular architectures in a wide variety of firms. Only a few 
Modularity Design Rules   (v.7 April 2018) 10 
firms known to the authors have clearly recognized the need for a broad set of rules 
for managing modular development processes like the MDRs we elaborate here, and 
even fewer firms have had the managerial and organizational capacity to implement 
modular development processes that adhere to these rules. However, such firms 
and processes do exist, as we note below, and we suggest that these firms' successes 
in creating and using modular architectures lend support to the validity of the MDRs 
we elaborate below.4 Thus, we suggest that firms that have the managerial and 
organizational capacity to implement these MDRs in strategically motivated 
modular development processes may be able to derive substantial competitive 
advantage over other firms with lesser abilities to implement the MDRs elaborated 
here. 
 
2.2  Modularity Design Rules:  Prior to Starting Component Development 
 Although much research on modularity has been focused on the processes 
firms use to develop components for their modular architectures (Baldwin and 
Clark 2000, Sanchez and Mahoney 1996), our research suggests that component 
development processes actually occupy a late and relatively predictable stage in 
successful processes for creating modular architectures. As we elaborate below, 
once the strategically critical attributes of a new modular architecture have been 
decided as the first step in a modular architecture development process, the 
technical development of components that will meet the strategic requirements for 
a new modular architecture should be a fairly routine undertaking.  
 We therefore begin this discussion by elaborating the MDRs that apply to the 
key strategic, managerial, and organizational processes that need to be in place in 
order to define adequately the strategic flexibilities desired from a new product 
architecture -- and that therefore must precede and then guide processes for 
developing components for a new architecture.  
 (Note: The numbering of the MDR below is intended primarily to provide a 
                                                        
4 The most architecturally advanced firms known to the authors in fact use alternative 
possibilities for future modular architectures as drivers of their long-term strategic 
capability development processes (Sanchez and Collins 2001). 
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means of referring to specific MDRs in our discussion, and is not intended to denote 
a strict sequential order of application in a modular architecture development 
process. In fact, most of the MDRs apply through more than one stage of 
development and some apply throughout all stages in the development and 
commercialization of a new modular architecture.) 
 
 MDR No. 1:  
 A new modular architecture must be developed using only proven component 
designs whose system behaviors are well understood and whose interface specifications 
can therefore be reliably defined. 
 We begin our list of MDRs with one of the least understood -- and most 
commonly misunderstood -- rules for developing modular architectures.  A modular 
architecture is modular precisely because it uses components that are technically 
independent (or "decoupled" from") other components in the architecture. In order 
to technically decouple components within an architecture, a firm's developers must 
know how the components will behave when used in a given kind of product design 
– i.e., their system properties -- and be able to define interface specifications between 
components such that changes in the design of a given component will not require 
compensating changes in the designs of other components in the architecture. This 
technical decoupling of components brings a number of benefits that are 
fundamental to modular architectures, including the ability to develop components 
concurrently -- resulting in faster development times -- and the ability to substitute 
a range of component variations freely within an architecture to configure new 
product variations (Garud and Kumaswamy 1995, Sanchez 1995).  
 Defining interfaces that can achieve technical decoupling of components 
within a modular architecture cannot be done reliably with new kinds of 
components whose system properties are not yet well understood (e.g., components 
based on new, unproven technologies). Thus, a bedrock principle of modular 
development processes is that new modular architectures can only incorporate 
components whose system behaviors (in that type of product architecture) are 
already well understood -- and whose interfaces are therefore reliably specifiable. 
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 A common misunderstanding about MDR No. 1 is that restricting development 
of modular architectures to using only well-understood, proven component designs 
will limit the ability of new modular architectures to introduce innovative new 
products based on new technologies and new kinds of components. This 
misunderstanding overlooks the highly disruptive effects and consequential delays 
that result when a firm tries to develop an architecture that includes technologically 
new components whose interfaces cannot be reliably specified.  Research has shown 
that as much as 80% of total development time can be wasted in repeatedly 
redesigning other components as errors and omissions in initial interfaces for 
unproven components are discovered during development (Sanchez and Collins 
2001). 
 By contrast, when technically new components are developed and proven "off 
line," as proposed formally in MDR No.2 below, then well-understood components 
with reliably specifiable interfaces can be developed in parallel processes and made 
available to next-generation architecture development projects. Studies have shown 
that some firms have been able to significantly accelerate their innovation processes 
by "fast cycling" through rapid development of successive generations of new 
architectures that incorporate technically new components only after the 
components have been adequately understood and proven to have reliably 
specifiable interfaces (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Sanchez 2004).  
 
 MRD No. 2: 
 Technical development of new technologies and new types of component based 
on new technologies must be carried out independently of modular architecture 
development processes. 
  For the reasons stated under MDR No.1 above, firms should not try to resolve 
technical uncertainties about new kinds of components as part of modular 
architecture development processes. Rather, new kinds of components should be 
investigated and developed through parallel, decoupled component development 
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processes.5 These “off-line” development processes should be focused on developing 
components for next-generation and future-generation architectures identified 
through a firm's strategic planning and capability development processes (Sanchez 
2012).  
 In effect, adopting modular architecture development processes requires a key 
change rom the traditional processes linking research and development (R+D) and 
new product development (NPD), as suggested in Figure 1. Instead of letting 
development of new architectures include processes for developing new kinds of 
components for which research has only provided “proof of concept,” modular 
architecture development processes require that new kinds of components 
suggested by “proof of concept” from R+D should be developed “off line” in parallel 
development processes until interfaces for each new type of component can be 
reliably specified (“proof of component”).  
 
 
 
                                                        
5 See discussion of "Decoupled Architectural Learning" from Figure 2(c) in Sanchez and 
Mahoney (1996), p71-72. 
Traditional	New	Product	Development:
R+D
New	Kinds	of	Components	Developed
During	New	Product	Development
“Proof	of	Concept”
For	New	Kinds	of
Components
Figure	1:		Traditional	versusModular	Processes	for	Developing	New	Kinds	of	Components
Modular	Architecture	Development:
“Off-line”	Component
Development
R+D
“Proof	of
Concept”
“Proof	of
Component”
Architecture
Development
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 Once new kinds of component designs have been developed and their system 
properties determined with confidence, new component designs and their attendant 
interface specifications can be released into a "design library" of proven component 
designs that are then available for use in developing next-generation modular 
architectures.  
 
 MDR No.3: 
 A firm's strategic and technical managers must determine through joint 
consultations the functionalities and other desired attributes to be provided by a new 
modular architecture.  
 Because a strategically modular product architecture is essentially a technical 
creation with a strategic mission, the functionalities and attributes that are 
strategically desired from a new modular architecture must be communicated by 
strategic managers to technical managers, who must in turn provide strategic 
managers with their assessments of what functionalities and attributes can 
currently be provided by the proven component designs available to the firm in 
developing a next generation architecture. Through an interactive dialogue, 
strategic and technical managers must jointly decide the specific components and 
interfaces to be used in the new architecture and the resulting functionalities and 
attributes the new architecture can be developed to provide. These consultations 
between strategic and technical constitute an essential first step in initiating a 
strategically motivated modular architecture development process.  
 
 MDR No.4: 
 Strategic managers must provide technical managers with a clear prioritization 
of the strategic benefits sought from a new architecture. 
 The many strategic flexibilities obtainable from a modular architecture make it 
possible to achieve a variety of strategic benefits through one architecture 
development process, including increasing product variety (by substituting 
component variations), rapidly upgrading product performance (by technologically 
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upgrading key components), reducing production costs (by using industry standard 
and/or common components), reducing development costs (by using components 
already developed by other firms), and increasing speed to market (through parallel 
development processes, re-using existing components, and/or involving more 
partners in developing new components), among others. While it may well be 
possible to obtain several or all of these benefits of modularity to some degree in a 
single architecture, technical constraints are likely to require trade-offs to be made 
among the potentially available benefits in developing an architecture.  
 In order for technical managers to strategically optimize a modular 
architecture during development, strategic managers must provide technical 
managers with a strategically prioritzed ranking of the modularity benefits sought 
from a new architecture. Without a clear set of priorities from strategic mangers, the 
technical trade-offs made during development are unlikely to be strategically 
coherent or effective in providing the kind of modular architecture sought by 
strategic managers.   
 
 MDR No. 5: 
 Once strategic managers commit to a given slate of strategic objectives and 
priorities for the various functionalities and other attributes to be provided by a new 
architecture, the list of development objectives and priorities must be "frozen" and not 
allowed to change during the ensuing architecture development process.  
 Allowing the functionalities and performance levels to be delivered by a new 
product to be a "moving target" is highly disruptive to any product development 
process, whether modular or non-modular. To preserve the advantages of greater 
development speed and/or parallel and distributed development of components 
that are obtainable with modular architectures, changes in strategic goals for an 
architecture cannot be allowed after development of a new architecture has begun. 
Instead, firms should develop an ability to keep up with changes in market 
requirements by “fast cycling” through successive generations of modular 
architectures, each of which can be developed relatively quickly when goals for each 
new architecture are not allowed to change during development. 
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 MDR No. 6: 
 Strategic and technical managers must jointly agree how the new modular 
architecture will be "strategically partitioned" into functional components. 
  The way in which a new architecture is decomposed into functional 
components will significantly affect the kinds of strategic benefits a modular 
architecture can provide. For example, in some cases it may be possible to lower 
unit production costs by combining two or more functions into one "compound" 
component, but doing so may increase the costs and time required to change any of 
the functions contained within the compound component design, thereby limiting 
the ability of a firm to configure product variations within the architecture.   
 Thus, once the strategic benefits to be sought from a new architecture have 
been clearly prioritized, technical managers must evaluate and then communicate to 
strategic managers the extent to which alternative ways of decomposing or 
"strategically partitioning" the new architecture into functional components would 
affect the new architecture's ability to deliver the prioritized strategic benefits 
sought from the architecture. Strategic and technical managers must then agree on 
the optimal approach to partitioning an architecture into functional components, 
given current strategic objectives and technical constraints. 
 
 MDR No. 7: 
 Interfaces between the components in a modular architecture must be defined to 
allow the substitution of a strategically desired range of component variations into the 
architecture -- without requiring compensating changes in the designs of other 
components in the architecture.  
 The specification of component interfaces in conventional NPD processes is 
often treated as a relatively unimportant technical detail. As a result, interfaces 
between components are often allowed to “evolve as needed" during conventional 
NPD processes or are simply deferred to the last stages of a development process.  
 In modular architecture development processes, however, interfaces between 
components must be fully specified before beginning detailed development of 
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components for a new architecture. Both the ability to develop component designs 
in parallel (concurrent component development) and to design component 
variations that can be freely substituted into an architecture without having to make 
compensating changes to the designs of other components depend on having stable, 
fully specified interfaces throughout the architecture development process. 
 In some cases, a firm may be able to use an "industry standard" interface that 
allows a broad range of readily available component variations to "plug and play" in 
a new architecture, such as a HDMI interface on a visual display and other 
electronics devices (Sanderson and Uzumeri 1997). Alternatively, a firm may design 
a set of proprietary interfaces that allow a range of proprietary and/or industry 
standard components to be used in its architecture, such as Apple has often used for 
connecting video devices to its laptops. 
 While even simple interfaces may enable a wide range of component 
variations to be introduced into an architecture, there are always technical limits to 
the range of component variations that can be used with any interface. Thus, 
strategic and technical managers must agree on the range of component variations 
to be accommodated by each interface in an architecture before specifying the 
interfaces to be adhered to throughout the architecture development process. 
 
2.3  Modularity Design Rules:  During Detailed Component Development  
 As suggested earlier, if the preceding MDRs have been followed throughout the 
processes leading up to the beginning of detailed component development, then the 
subsequent processes for developing specific component variations for a new 
architecture should become relatively routine. However, achieving the strategic 
benefits sought from a modular architecture, both during and after development, 
depends on a firm's ability to maintain two critical forms of organizational discipline 
during detailed component development processes, as addressed by MDR No. 8 and 
MDR No.9 below.  
 
 MDR No. 8: 
 The specific strategic partitioning of a new architecture into functional 
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components decided prior to beginning detailed component development must be 
strictly followed throughout the component development process. 
 The strategic partitioning of a new architecture into functional components 
prior to beginning development of the components for the architecture (see MDR No. 
6) is intended to provide a component structure that best supports the intended 
strategic uses of a new architecture. While one might hope that component 
developers are fully aware of and respect the strategic reasons for a particular 
strategic partitioning, that may not always be the case in every organization. It is 
possible (and the authors have indeed observed) that well-intended component 
designers may take it upon themselves to change the way a new architecture has 
been strategically partitioned, usually for what appear to them to be eminently 
sensible "technical reasons."  
 For example, component designers may think it would "save cost" to combine 
two or more components into a single compound component design -- when 
unbeknownst to them, doing so would limit the ability of the firm to carry out its 
intended strategy by limiting or eliminating the ability to introduce component 
variations into the new architecture. Thus, strict organizational discipline is 
required to assure that the strategic partitioning of components decided prior to the 
beginning of development is the set of components that component developers 
actually develop. 
 
 MDR No. 9: 
 Once the interfaces are specified for a new architecture, the interfaces must be 
frozen and not allowed to change during ensuing processes for developing components 
for the new architecture.  
 Because a modular architecture is a system of components that must function 
together physically (or purely logically, in the case of software architectures), even 
simple and seemingly innocuous changes in interface specifications during 
development may create unintended changes in the interactions between 
components that may not have been anticipated by -- and may therefore disrupt -- 
any ongoing component development processes. While it is common practice in 
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conventional NPD to allow changes in interfaces between components during 
component development, the rapid, concurrent, and possibly distributed 
development of components in a modular development processes depends on 
maintaining a consistent set of interface specifications to assure a stable technical 
environment for developing the component variations intended for a new 
architecture.  
 A further, very important strategic benefit of strictly adhering to initial 
interface specifications during component development is that doing so will quickly 
reveal how capable a development organization is of specifying interfaces so that a 
given component will perform as intended in a new architecture. When interfaces 
can be changed by developers during component development, it is likely that 
managers will be unable to detect any inability or limitations of developers to define 
adequate interface specifications for a new architecture. Thus, requiring developers 
to specify interfaces that must be adhered to throughout component development 
provides a key means for managers to evaluate the technical capabilities of their 
organization's developers.6 
 
2.4  Modularity Design Rules:  After Component Development  
 Two aspects of modular architectures are also critical to maintain after 
components have been developed and a new architecture has been put into 
commercial use, as addressed by MDR No. 10 below. 
  
 MDR No. 10: 
 The strategic partitioning and interface specifications used to create a new 
product architecture must be maintained throughout the period of commercial use of 
the architecture. 
                                                        
6 The managerial visibility into developers’ capabilities that results from requiring 
developers to fully specify interfaces at the beginning of architecture development 
processes may be seen as threatening by some developers, who may seek to resist fully 
specifying interfaces in various ways, including through claims of “impossibility.” 
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 Once a new architecture is "released" for commercial use, organizational 
responsibility for the architecture is often transferred from development engineers 
to engineers charged with "maintaining" the architecture. Unless this new group of 
engineers is fully informed about the strategic purpose for the architecture and the 
strategic reasons behind the architecture's strategic partitioning and interface 
specifications, they may begin to make well-intended technical changes to the 
architecture's component structure and/or interfaces. Such changes may, however, 
have very undesirable consequences.   
 Maintenance engineers may try to undertake the same kinds of "cost-saving" 
changes to the component structure of an architecture that component developers 
might think it would be desirable to undertake during development. For example, 
maintenance engineers may decide that integrating components that have been 
decoupled for strategic reasons would save cost or improve performance. However, 
this and other kinds of changes to an architecture could limit the ability to introduce 
variations of the affected components during the commercial lifetime of the 
architecture. Similarly, changes intended to "simplify" or otherwise modify 
interfaces may impose limitations on the configurability of an architecture already 
in commercial use. Thus, as a general rule, managers should monitor the activities of 
engineers responsible for maintaining an architecture to make sure that no changes 
are made to components or interfaces that could affect the reliability or 
configurability of the architecture are made after development of the architecture. 
 Moreover, free-lanced changes to interfaces during the commercial lifetime 
of an architecture may make it impossible for both strategic and technical managers 
to ascertain how effective the originally specified interfaces for the architecture 
have been in delivering the configurability and reliability they were designed to 
provide. As Toyota has learned and incorporated into its Toyota Production System, 
the ability to determine exactly what was done by whom -- and then to link that 
information to the subsequent performance of a finished product -- is essential in 
identifying assembly task definitions and individual workers in need of 
improvement (Spear and Bowen 1999). Analogously, the ability to link specific 
development decisions and individual developers to the subsequent performance of 
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the components they have designed is essential to improving both individual skills 
and organizational capabilities in developing effective modular architectures 
(Sanchez 2000, 2005; Sanchez and Collins 2001).  
 
  
Modularity Design Rules   (v.7 April 2018) 22 
 
3. KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IN ADOPTING MODULAR ARCHITECTURES 
 
 The implementation of the ten Modularity Design Rules elaborated in the 
preceding section is likely to pose very significant challenges to senior and mid-level 
managers, especially those seeking to lead their organizations in a transition from 
traditional development practices to modular architecture development processes. 
We next identify what we suggest are likely to be the key challenges to be met by 
managers in making this transition. 
 
3.1 Willingness to Learn  
 For an organization to make a transition to the well-defined and 
organizationally disciplined modular strategies and development processes 
indicated by our Modularity Design Rules requires that its managers -- especially its 
senior managers -- be willing and able to learn a new way of thinking and managing 
that is profoundly different from conventional management practices, especially in 
(but not limited to) new product development and product strategies. Given the 
extent to which adoption of modular strategies is likely to affect virtually every 
aspect of an organization and its processes, it is simply not sufficient for senior 
managers to ask mid-level and technical managers to learn about modularity and to 
delegate to them the task of implementing modularity strategies and development 
processes. 
 The effective implementation of modular strategies in a firm's product 
markets requires that senior managers be willing to invest their time and 
intelligence in developing a deep understanding of modularity's new way of 
approaching and serving markets (Sanchez 1999). Such major changes in firm 
strategies will not be possible unless the firm's senior managers are willing and able 
to provide the intellectual leadership needed to understand and support the firm's 
transition to modular strategies and processes.  
 Managers in many -- perhaps even most -- organizations may fail to 
understand the nature, depth, and scope of the organizational changes required to 
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adopt modular strategies and processes, and as a result they would be very likely to 
fail in trying to implement what they think are modular strategies. Perhaps the most 
perverse organizational outcomes, however, are likely to occur when senior 
management demands -- but fails to fully understand, support, and monitor -- a 
transformation to modular strategies and processes. In such cases, mid-level 
managers and technical managers who have yet to understand and accept 
modularity strategies and practices may make some superficial changes to 
conventional NPD practices -- while assuring senior managers that they are now 
doing "modularity."   
 For example, one of the co-authors knows of an automobile company in 
Europe that regularly professes to be following modularity practices -- but the firm 
does not define its vehicles' interfaces strategically or even in a modular way (MDR 
No. 7), does not freeze interfaces during development (MDR No. 9), and does not 
adhere to defined interfaces during the commercial use and maintenance of the 
architecture (MDR No. 10). As a result, the firm routinely faces many costly 
problems of recently designed components not fitting or working properly when 
vehicles are being assembled. Because of these problems, many senior managers in 
the firm have become convinced that "modularity doesn't work"(!). This unfortunate 
but wholly avoidable outcome is the direct result of senior management's 
unwillingness to invest their time and intelligence in (i) learning what modularity 
actually means and (ii) supporting their firm's transition to modularity by assuring 
that the processes implemented by the firm's mid-level managers in fact conform to 
the meaning of and requirements for modular development processes. 
 
3.2  Willingness to Become Involved   
 As indicated by several of the Modularity Design Rules, the development of 
modular architectures intended to support clearly defined product strategies 
requires that strategic managers responsible for product lines directly and 
intensively consult with the technical managers who must develop modular 
architectures for their product lines.  
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 In many firms, channels and processes for intensive consultations between 
strategic managers and technical managers about market needs and technical 
possibilities for serving those needs simply do not exist. Moreover, in many 
organizations, especially larger ones, senior managers have become increasingly 
focused on managing costs affecting their firm's financial performance, and may be 
quite unclear as to how various product functions, features, and performance levels 
may affect the perceived value of their products in the eyes of customers.  
 To fulfill their role in making a transition to modular product strategies and 
development processes, strategic managers must be willing to "become involved" -- 
i.e., to engage in extensive discussions with their firm's marketing and technical 
managers as to current and emerging market preferences and available technical 
possibilities for serving those preferences through modular architectures and 
product strategies. 
  
3.3  Willingness to Change 
 As suggested by several of the Modularity Design Rules, the transition from 
conventional to modular product strategies and development practices typically 
requires major organizational transformations -- in task allocations, authority 
distributions, information flows, and performance measures and evaluations 
(Sanchez 2008). The scope and depth of the organizational changes required to 
implement modular strategies effectively are simply beyond the authority typically 
vested in mid-level managers to undertake. Thus, achieving the significant 
organizational changes required to adopt modular development processes will 
require that a firm's senior managers be willing to initiate significant organization 
change. As Sanchez (2015) has suggested, modularity is not for the timid. 
 
3.4  Willingness to Lead  
 Perhaps the most critical challenge in firms considering a transition to 
modular product strategies is the need for senior managers to be willing to fulfill an 
essential senior management leadership role in making this transition.  
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 Any major change in an organization entails substantial risks -- risks of 
failure, wasted resources, and loss of managerial reputation due to inadequately 
defined or misdirected initiatives, insufficient commitment and motivation, 
inadequate capability, unforeseen difficulties, etc. Leading major organization 
change requires that senior managers accept the ownership of those risks -- and 
then urge the organization forward and support its many changes. As one manager 
who launched the organizational transformation to modularity in his firm once said 
to one of the co-authors,   
 
"I didn't know at the beginning of this process how it would all turn out.  
But I did know that if it succeeded, I would praise my employees and give them 
all the credit -- and if it failed, I alone would take the hit." 
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4. RENAULT-NISSAN ALLIANCE'S TRANSITION TO A "COMMON MODULE FAMILY"   
     MODULAR ARCHITECTURE 
 
 We now report some key results of a multi-year, longitudinal study by this paper's 
co-authors of the Renault-Nissan Alliance's (RNA) adoption of a modular "Common 
Module Family" (CMF) architecture intended to serve as the basis for more than 50 
vehicle models. Our study examined both the modular vehicle architecture developed by 
RNA and the managerial and organizational changes made by RNA senior management to 
initiate and support the transition to modular development processes. 
 In the following discussion, we suggest why RNA adopted the CMF modular 
architecture to support its global strategy and how the changes in management and 
organization processes undertaken by RNA to support development of the CMF modular 
architecture directly reflect the Modularity Design Rules we elaborate in Section 2. We 
also suggest how RNA management met the challenges of leading a transition to modular 
development processes described in Section 3.   
 
4.1  Modularity in RNA's Global Strategy 
 The global automotive industry has historically faced both very substantial sunk 
costs for product development and production tooling, on the one hand, and rapidly 
rising demand for more differentiated models and even for mass-customized products, on 
the other. In this regard, it was perhaps inevitable that at least some major automobile 
producers would turn to modular product architectures to seek new possibilities for 
reducing costs while increasing product variety. The use of modular "platform" 
architectures adopted by Volkswagen in the early 1990s, for example, sought to lower 
product costs substantially while enabling greater product variety, and has been 
extensively reported (Pandremenos et al. 2009). More recently, however, the Renault-
Nissan Alliance, formed in March 1999 by the French producer Renault and the Japanese 
producer Nissan, has undertaken an ambitious program to use a new modular 
architecture to substantially reduce product costs while offering an expanded range of 
sport utility vehicle (SUV) models in their global markets. 
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 In February 2012, Mr. Carlos Ghosn, then President and Chairman of RNA, 
announced the existence of a "4+1 Common Module Family" (CMF) program whose intent 
was to create a modular vehicle architecture that would achieve substantial vehicle cost 
reductions while serving as the basis for more than 50 SUV models for the Renault and 
Nissan brands. The "4+1" refers to the strategic partitioning of the new CMF modular 
vehicle architecture into four large body modules (engine compartment, front underbody, 
rear underbody, and cockpit) and one electrical/electronics module (also known as the 
electronic vehicle architecture, or "EVA").  
 As suggested in Figure 2, the indicated variations in the four main body modules 
could be "mixed and matched" to produce visually distinct models within four families of 
vehicle types, identified as multi-purpose vehicles (MPVs), sport-utility vehicles (SUVs), 
conventional sedans (SEDs), and smaller hatch-back vehicles (H/Bs). The variations in 
the combinable big modules shown in Figure 1 can in principle provide 2 × 3 × 3 × 3 = 54 
distinct body shapes for at least that many different product models produced under the 
Renault and Nissan brands. 
 
 
 
Figure	2:		“Big	Modules”	in	“Common	Module	Family”	(CMF)	Architecture
(Source:	Renault-Nissan	Alliance)
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The strategic motivation for the CMF modular architecture was to enable 
configuration of a range of vehicles with different designs and functionalities while 
greatly increasing commonality of body parts and components, thereby achieving 
both greater product variety and lower costs through large-scale production and 
assembly of common body modules and related components. The cost savings to be 
achieved through mass production of common modules and components were then 
to be invested in improving the environmental and safety performance of RNA's 
vehicles -- two aspects of vehicles that were becoming increasingly important 
sources of competitive advantage in major automotive markets around the world.   
 The first CMF-based model introduced to the market was the Nissan X-Trail 
that began mass production in the autumn of 2013. Subsequently more than 1.6 
million CMF-derived vehicles (composed of two types of Nissan X-Trail vehicles and 
10 Renault SUV models) were brought to market by mid-2017. At least 56% 
component commonality (cost basis) between Renault and Nissan vehicles was 
achieved -- with a resulting overall 30% reduction in development and production 
costs per vehicle -- while maintaining the distinctiveness of Renault and Nissan 
vehicle designs and expanding the number of distinct product models available to 
each firm in the RNA global product portfolio.7 
 
4.2 Launch of the CMF Initiative 
 The CMF initiative announced by Carlos Ghosn in February 2012 had actually 
been launched internally in September 2009 jointly at Renault's design centers near 
Paris, France, and Nissan's R+D center near Tokyo, Japan. Much of the first year of 
the initiative was spent identifying how the two firms' development structures and 
processes would have to change from their then traditional, model-focused 
                                                        
7 During the CFM architecture development process, RNA managers came to believe that the 
"optimal extent of commonality" to be sought through the CFM architecture would lie 
somewhere between 50% and 75% commonality of components in vehicle models derived 
from the CFM architecture. Their conclusion was that more than 75% component 
commonality would result in vehicles that would not be adequately differentiated from each 
other in the market, while less than 50% component commonality would not achieve the 
full extent of component cost reductions available through the CMF architecture. 
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development processes to a new architecture-focused process that could serve the 
market strategies and incorporate the technical resources of the two companies 
working together.  
 The development of new management and organization processes for 
developing the CMF architecture was driven by the pointed and ongoing monitoring 
of the project's progress by Carlos Ghosn personally and by the assignment of 
responsibility for the CMF architecture initiative to several senior executives within 
both Renault and Nissan. Selection of staff from various areas of the two companies 
for participation in the CMF project was communicated as an important form of 
personal recognition and as an opportunity to play a key role in shaping the RNA of 
the future. All told, more than 200 people were selected and charged with creating 
not just the first CMF for RNA -- but also with creating the management and 
organizational processes that would unite the two companies in defining and 
developing CFM architectures that would be the shared basis for their future 
strategies. 
  
4.3  New Organization Structures and Management Processes for  
        Strategic Partitioning of the CMF Modular Architecture 
 The approach the CMF team took to defining new management and 
organizational processes for developing the first CMF architecture mirrored the 
logical sequence of technical decisions that would have to be made in order to define 
and develop any CMF modular architecture that would be effective in supporting 
RNA's prioritized goals for the architecture. The CMF team therefore focused first on 
creating new organizational structures and management processes for defining the 
component structure (i.e., the strategic partitioning) of the CMF architecture.  
 As we have noted, effective strategic partitioning of a strategically modular 
architecture requires extensive consideration of strategic, marketing, and technical 
factors affecting the products to be derived from the architecture. At the launch of 
the CMF project, no organizational structures or processes existed within Renault or 
Nissan to support such an undertaking. Beginning in September 2009, the CMF team 
leaders therefore focused on defining the new organizational structures and 
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processes that they believed they would need in order to decide how the CMF 
architecture could best be strategically partitioned.  
 The strategic mission of the CMF architecture had been clearly articulated by 
RNA top management: the new CMF modular architecture was to enable substantial 
per unit cost reductions through large-scale production of common modules to be 
shared across several and perhaps all models, while at the same time supporting the 
distinctiveness of the Renault and Nissan brands and at least the current range of 
product variety offered by each brand. Given these clear priorities for the new 
architecture, the CMF team recognized that defining the optimal strategic 
partitioning of the architecture would require new forms of intensive consultations 
between marketing staff and technical staff from the two companies.  
 The CMF team also knew that if staff from the two areas of expertise or from 
the two companies could not agree on what partitioning would be optimal, someone 
would have to have overall responsibility and authority for deciding the strategic 
partitioning to be adopted. The CMF team therefore instituted the organization 
structure shown in Figure 3 to manage the strategic partitioning of the CMF 
architecture. 
 In the organization structure shown in Figure 3, the Chief Vehicle Engineer 
(CVE) is responsible for all the technical aspects of the vehicles configured within 
the CMF architecture to be developed, while responsibility for market analysis and 
planning for the vehicles to be derived from the new architecture is vested in the 
Chief Product Specialist (CPS). Overseeing the process of deciding how best to 
strategically partition the CMF architecture is the Program Director (PD), who has 
authority to decide the specific market goals for the CMF architecture, the types of 
vehicles the architecture will support, and the number of vehicle variations that will 
be leveraged from the architecture.  Moreover, all these marketing variables were to 
be decided within specific expectations for financial performance set by RNA top 
management for the CMF architecture. These three senior managers (drawn from 
both Renault and Nissan) were charged with managing both the development of the 
CMF architecture and the subsequent configuring of individual models within the 
CMF architecture. 
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 After extensive consultations, the CMF management team decided that an 
architecture strategically partitioned into four big body modules and one 
electrical/electronic module would most effectively serve and support the strategic 
priorities for the new architecture (See Figure 2). (The CMF architecture includes 
common interfaces for attaching all roof panels, but specific roof designs were 
reserved to be added later and designed specifically for each product model to 
enhance product differentiation.)  A "module manager" was appointed for each of 
the 4+1 big modules. The module managers were made responsible for the designs 
of their module, for subsequent performance improvements for their module, and 
for the compatibility of the components used within each module.  
 The 4+1 "big modules" adopted by the CMF team as the first level of strategic 
partitioning of the CMF architecture each contained significant numbers of 
components. To achieve scale economies from use of common components, the CMF 
team had to further strategically partition each of the 4 big module to define the 
specific kinds of components that would be used in each module and to identify the 
components that could be used in common across product models in the CMF 
PD	- Program	Director
CPS	- Chief	Product	Specialist CVE	- Chief	Vehicle	Engineer
Manager
Engine	Compartment
Module
Figure	3:		Organization	Structure	for	Strategic	Partitioning	and	Development	of	CMF	Architecture
(Source:	Renault-Nissan	Alliance)
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architecture. The CMF team soon realized that three issues would have to be 
managed in deciding which components within each CMF module would be used in 
common across all or many product models and which would be specific to 
individual models or brands. 
  First, the market requirements affecting a number of components were quite 
different in Renault's and Nissan's main markets of Europe, Asia, and North America, 
so trade-offs would have to be made between using standard components across the 
three regions to increase scale and reduce unit costs, on the one hand, and allowing 
region-specific component variations to locally adapt vehicles to meet regional 
market preferences and requirements, on the other. Second, for many kinds of 
components Renault and Nissan had historically used different kinds of design 
solutions (referred to as "Technical Policies" within Nissan), and thus the two firms 
had different ways of locating and otherwise integrating various components into 
their vehicle architectures. Third, each company had their own distinctive ways of 
designing major elements of their vehicle architectures, such as designs of the 
"crash cage" for protecting passengers in a collision, the general arrangement of the 
engine compartment, and the positioning of driver and passenger seats within a 
vehicle.  
 In some instances, differences in the component functionalities and design 
solutions sought by Renault's and Nissan's development staffs could be resolved by 
purely technical means. Nevertheless, some disagreements about component 
designs reflected underlying differences in marketing objectives, production 
capabilities, or other factors that could not be resolved by technical staff alone.  Each 
component whose functionality and design could not be agreed between the two 
firms or between marketing and technical staffs was identified as a "Road Block" 
("RB" for short). Identified RBs were, in effect, the manifestations of significant 
organizational or strategic differences between two companies that would have to 
be resolved by senior managers before the two companies could begin to create a 
vehicle architecture with substantial component commonality. New management 
processes would have to be created to manage decisions about common 
components to be used by the two companies in the CMF architecture. 
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 In all, by November 2009 more than 800 component RBs were identified 
across the 4+1 big modules. To resolve the 800+ RBs, senior RNA management 
established a new management process composed of a Joint Steering Committee 
(JSC] for each of the five big modules (see Figure 4). Each JSC was composed of 
senior managers from both firms and reported directly to the senior executives of 
both firms. The JSC for each big module then assigned CMF team members and other 
RNA staff with relevant marketing and technical expertise to work together in 
"Upstream Strategic Focus Teams” (USFTs) to resolve each component RB. In all, 76 
USFTs were created to resolve Road Blocks for specific types of components.  
 
 
 
Importantly, the JSC also promulgated a "new rule" requiring that no 
development work on any component could begin until all RBs for that component 
had been resolved and approval for the component had been received from the JSC 
for the part of the CMF architecture that incorporated each component. For their 
RENAULT-NISSAN	ALLIANCE
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CCT	– Cross	Company	Team
(senior	executive	level)
ACM	- Alliance	Commodity	Meeting
(senior	executive	level)
Figure	4:		Management	Process	for	Resolving	“Road	Blocks”	in	Development	of	CMF	Architecture
(Source:	Renault-Nissan	Alliance)
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part, the JSCs coordinated with the Cross-Company Team of senior executives from 
both firms to assure that each technical solution accepted for an identified RB would 
be effective in supporting the each firm’s marketing strategy. In total, more than 
1500 employees from Renault and Nissan participated in 76 USFTs focused on 
resolving component RBs. 
 RNA senior management also established Joint Steering Committees (JSCs) 
staffed by senior managers from the two firms to resolve cross-company issues 
arising in the detailed development of each of the 4+1 modules, as well as a JSC to 
coordinate the two firms' marketing plans for models derived from the first CMF 
architecture. 
 Using this new organizational structure and management process, the full list 
of 800+ component RBs and a number of big module and marketing issues were 
resolved in the 15 months between September 2009 and December 2010, after 
which full-scale development of components was finally allowed to proceed. 
 
4.4 New Processes for Involving Suppliers in CMF Architecture Development 
 Developing the CMF architecture and producing a range of CMF vehicle 
models with high levels of component commonality required significant changes in 
both Renault's and Nissan's relationships with their suppliers.  Prior to the 
development of the CMF architecture, both firms developed and purchased 
components for individual vehicle models. By standardizing on common 
components, the production volumes for each component used in the CMF 
architecture increased dramatically -- from typical single-model lots of 
approximately 100,000 units to more than 1,700,000 units for all CMF models. The 
shift from small lots of many component variations to large lots of common 
components meant that RNA's interactions with its suppliers had to change from 
arm's-length contracting with many suppliers to close cooperation with fewer but 
larger suppliers. 
 Recognizing the need for new kinds of interactions and processes with 
suppliers, the CMF team began to build new kinds of relationships with their 
suppliers -- at both strategic and operational levels -- in the early stages of CMF 
Modularity Design Rules   (v.7 April 2018) 35 
development. The cooperative relationships the CMF team developed at the 
strategic level involved sharing sensitive market information and cost targets with 
suppliers, so that suppliers could make better decisions in allocating their own 
resources to development and production activities supporting the CMF 
architecture. 
 Similarly, at the operational level, closer cooperative relationships were built 
so that the CMF architecture development process could both provide more 
complete information to suppliers and more effectively draw on the expertise of 
suppliers. For example, suppliers received much more information than previously 
about projected production volumes and expected model variations, and were in 
turn asked to propose component designs that would increase possibilities for 
component sharing across anticipated models.  
 
4.5  Processes for Specifying and Controlling Interfaces During and After  
       Development 
 As in any modular architecture, the interfaces between the CMF 's big 
modules and between their respective sets of components determined the ease with 
which -- and thus the extent to which -- the big modules can be mixed and matched 
to configure different product models, as well as the extent to which the 
components used in each module can be used in common across product models. 
Accordingly, the 76 USFTs created to develop suitable modules and components for 
the CMF architecture were also charged with specifying interfaces for their module 
or component that would enable as many components as technically possible to 
become common components within the CFM architecture.   
 The USFTs were also responsible for assuring that the interfaces specified for 
each CFM module and related components remained "frozen" (standardized) and 
were adhered to during module and component development processes. Given the 
deep experience and accumulated knowledge in both Nissan and Renault relevant to 
the 4+1 modules and related components, computer simulation technology could be 
used both to develop modules and components and to confirm the suitability of the 
interfaces between modules and components during development.   
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5.  MODULAR DESIGN RULES IN RNA'S DEVELOPMENT OF ITS CMF  
      MODULAR ARCHITECTURE 
 We think it is appropriate to note that RNA's success in developing its new 
Common Module Family modular architecture was remarkable in a number of respects. 
For one, the highly successful CMF development process was the result of a first effort by 
Renault and Nissan create a modular architecture that would serve the diverse 
requirements for their individual brands of vehicles in the Asian, European, and North 
American markets. Moreover, the CMF project was not a small-scale "pilot project" 
intended to test the feasibility of using a common modular architecture for the two firms' 
products. On the contrary, the CMF project was specifically charged with creating a 
common vehicle architecture that would be the basis for projected production of nearly 
two million vehicles whose costs of production would run into tens of billions of US 
dollars. In addition, the CMF project had to find a way to bring together two firms with 
very different traditions in vehicle development, design, and marketing -- and somehow 
found a way to enable the two firms to work together in creating a common vehicle 
architecture that would serve the interests of both firms well. 
 Perhaps the daunting nature and scale of the task facing the CMF team -- coupled 
with the lack of any pre-existing management processes or organizational structures in 
either company for accomplishing such a task -- left the CMF team no choice but to invent 
a radically new way of working in order to begin development of a common modular 
architecture. In any event, we suggest that the management processes and organization 
structures implemented by RNA senior management and the CMF team reflect the 
Modular Design Rules elaborated in Section 2 to a remarkable extent. 
 At the launch of the CMF project, RNA senior management gave essential strategic 
direction to the CMF development process by providing a clear statement of prioritized 
strategic goals for the CMF architecture (MDR No. 4). Moreover, the strategic goals given 
by top management for the CMF architecture remained the same throughout the CMF 
development process (MDR No. 5). 
 To achieve the strategic goal of substantial reducing unit costs through use of 
common components (while maintaining brand distinctiveness and requisite product 
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variety), the CMF team was composed of both marketing strategy and technical staffs that 
worked directly with each other and that were supported by and reported directly to 
RNA's strategic-level managers (MDR No. 3). 
 The first task undertaken by the CMF team was deciding the component structure 
(strategic partitioning) of the CMF architecture to be developed (MDR No. 6). In order to 
provide a stable technical structure for the new architecture to be developed, the 
strategic partitioning of the CMF architecture into 4+1 "big modules" and then into the 
components that would be used within each module was maintained throughout the CMF 
development commercialization process (MDR No. 8). 
 After the strategic partitioning of the CMF architecture was decided, the interfaces 
between the 4+1 modules and between their respective components were defined and 
frozen to enable concurrent development of components (MDR No. 9). The defined 
interfaces were maintained through the component development phase both for 
standard components that would be used across many or all product models within the 
CMF architecture to achieve cost reductions and for components that would be "mixed 
and matched" within the CMF architecture to create product variations (MDF No. 7). 
 Once the strategic partitioning of the CMF architecture was accomplished and the 
interfaces between 4+1 modules and between their respective components were defined, 
then -- and only then -- were detailed component development processes allowed to 
begin, both for components for the initial vehicles models to be derived from the CMF 
architecture and for components for new models to follow. Only after completing 
development of the 4+1 modules and related components were various vehicle models 
configured using the fully developed 4+1 modules and related components for the CMF 
architecture  (MDRs No. 1, 2, and 10). 
 We also note that throughout the CMF architecture creation process, RNA senior 
management demonstrated their willingness to perform the top management roles that 
we have suggested (in Section 3) are essential to achieving success in any strategic 
modular architecture development process:  (i) to be willing to learn a significantly new 
way of setting strategies and of managing strategic processes, (ii) to be willing to become 
personally involved in directly supporting the strategically important modular 
architecture initiatives, (iii) to be willing to undertake significant change in their 
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respective organization's management processes and organizational  structures in order  
to implement the new way of working, and (iv) to be willing to provide essential strategic 
leadership by sponsoring -- and bearing the risk of -- a modular architecture development 
initiative that would lay the foundation for their two companies' futures. 
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6.  Conclusions 
 The normative model of Modularity Design Rules for modular architecture 
development processes that we elaborate here reflects nearly two decades of theory 
development and empirical research into modularity and modular architecture 
strategies (Sanchez 1995, 1999; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, 2013; Sanderson and 
Uzumeri 1997; Worren, Moore and Cardona 2002). These modular development 
processes are fundamentally different both from the practices followed in 
traditional approaches to managing new product development. They also differ 
fundamentally from related development models such as "Overlapping Problem 
Solving" (Clark and Fujimoto 1991), which Sanchez and Mahoney (1996) 
characterize as essentially an effort to compress and thereby accelerate traditional 
development processes.  
 Because modular development processes are a relatively recent evolution in 
our understanding of how products can be developed, in management research or 
management practice there is not yet a common consistent understanding of how 
modular development processes need to be managed and organized.  Baldwin and 
Clark's (2000) Design Rules was an early effort to delve into modular development 
processes by suggesting that achieving technical decoupling among components in 
an architecture would be facilitated by decoupling the organizational processes for 
developing such components.   
 In this discussion, we have sought to elaborate an expanded notion of 
"Modularity Design Rules" that go beyond Baldwin and Clark's essentially technical 
perspective on Design Rules to present an interrelated set of managerial and 
organizational rules that we suggest must be understood and followed in order to 
implement successful processes for developing modular architectures of strategic 
importance to an organization. We have also suggested that the top managements of 
firms have essential roles that they must fulfill in supporting the adoption and 
implementation of Modular Design Rules. 
 We have sought to provide some empirical evidence in support of the 
Modular Design Rules and essential top management roles elaborated here by 
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reporting a case study of an initiative by the Renault-Nissan Alliance to create a 
"Common Module Family" modular architecture of major strategic importance to 
the two firms that make up the Alliance. We suggest that the notable findings that 
can be derived from our case study are that (i) all ten of the Modular Design Rules 
that we propose here were in fact recognized as necessary and followed by RNA 
senior management and the CMF development team in their highly successful 
development of the CMF modular architecture, and (ii) top management of the 
Alliance demonstrated their willingness to perform the four senior management 
roles that we suggest are also essential to achieving success in a strategic modular 
development process. 
 There are obvious limits to what can justifiably be inferred from a single case 
study, even one reporting a remarkable achievement such as this one does, and thus 
we do not suggest that the "single data point" that we have reported in our case 
study provides conclusive evidence in support of our propositions.  Rather, we 
suggest that the empirical contribution of this paper is to add another case study to 
ongoing research suggesting that successful creation of strategically significant 
modular architectures requires following specific managerial and organizational 
processes and rules for governing those processes, and that top management must 
play an active role in giving strategic direction to and actively supporting 
development processes for such architectures. 
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